How Prophet Abraham Becomes Secular: The Conceptualization Of Enlightenment

Elif Feyza Dinç
14 min readJan 27, 2024

The definition of Enlightenment influences how we relate the notions of secularism, religion, and science. Talal Asad, drawing on Foucault, proposes a genealogical analysis of these notions, which entails viewing secularism not as a universal phenomenon, but as a by-product of Western history and culture, and acknowledging the diversity of secularisms across different contexts, as well as the fluidity of both secularism and religion as categories (Asad 1993). One of the consequences of this gap is the portrayal of Islam as a rigid, dogmatic, and private belief system that is incompatible with the public sphere and the term “scientific”. Asad’s concept of discursive tradition emphasizes the link between past-present-future and the way its practitioners experience Islam in various historical and situational settings. In this paper, I will explore the constitutive relationship between ‘religion’ and secularism, and critically examine some of the implicit assumptions and power dynamics that shape the field of study. The discussion will begin by exploring Foucault’s view of the Enlightenment and looking at the many forms of secularism and how they might orientalize religion. Then, it moves to an examination of Islam as a “way of life,” investigating the relationship between “religion” and science, and examining the narrative of disenchantment.

To begin with, Foucault’s vision of enlightenment embodies a mindset that encourages movement, change, and a discourse of ideas. Foucault views the embrace of change as an act of devotion acknowledging that spiritual transformation involves both internal and external dimensions, demanding continuous inner adjustments (Foucult 1984). The ultimate aim of this process is to achieve a sense of completeness and fulfillment, symbolizing personal growth and development. Furthermore, Foucault’s perspective emphasizes the ability to construct subjects and contemplate within a compartmentalized mindset, including the skill of recognizing oneself as a subject within the broader framework of the world. This holistic approach to enlightenment encompasses not only individual transformation but also the contemplation of one’s position within the system of societal structures and norms.

Foucault’s stance on the Enlightenment neither fully embraces nor entirely rejects it; rather, he seeks to comprehend it as a historical occurrence (Foucult 1984). He does not align himself with specific Enlightenment doctrines, such as the notions of linear progress, the separation of religion and reason, or the contrast between tradition and modernity. Instead, he adopts a particular attitude in the Enlightenment, which he terms as a “permanent critique” (Foucult 1984). This entails an ongoing examination and questioning of the norms, values, and conditions of his contemporary era, with a pursuit of novel ways of thinking and acting that are not confined by past or present influences. According to Foucault, it is this sense of perpetual movement and transformation that sets the Enlightenment apart from other historical periods.

Towards the end of the 20th century, especially with the Iranian revolution of 1979, Enlightenment as a shift to “rationality” and the narrative of secularization faced challenges. Successful religious revolutions, as well as other worldwide social movements, have prompted a reevaluation of the secularization thesis (Jakobsen and Pellegrini 2008). According to Foucault, what made the Iranian revolution a moment of enlightenment was its dare to collapse the conditions of the present, whether it resulted in “Islamic” or “secular” regime change. Foucault distinguished himself when he questioned the instant distrust directed at the word ‘Islamic’ in the phrase “Islamic government” (Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi 2016, 159–86). According to him, the phrase ‘government’ alone is enough to cause problems, and adding adjectives like socialist, democratic, or liberal does not exempt it from its primary obligation. He admired the mass movement’s resistance to repression, regardless of society’s political disagreements, which is a way of emancipating by investigating the evolution of power and knowledge structures over time and understanding their impact on the potential for action and thought.

Furani articulates one of the ways of emancipation by introducing the concept of “Abraham’s secularity” (Furani 2015). Prophet Abraham sought an opportunity to show his people how powerless and useless the idols they worship are, and, he entered the idol house and broke all the idols except the largest one (Harman 2000). In this context, Abraham’s act of questioning and confronting can be interpreted as a form of emancipation, as he engages in a critical inquiry that challenges existing beliefs and structures, which can be viewed as a step towards liberation from rigid religious or idolatrous frameworks.

The notion of ‘secular’ is not fixed or monolithic; rather, it is contingent and contextual. Therefore, it is possible to conceive of a ‘religious’ figure, such as Prophet Abraham, as having secular attributes or influences. The word “secular” has its roots in pre-Christian Latin, from “saeculum,” which conveyed the concepts of finiteness, transience, and the earthly (Furani 2015). This term possessed a flexible nature, enabling it to encompass the finite and address transience within both temporal and spatial contexts. While not explicitly labeled as such, Al-Ghazali’s differentiation between images and meanings aligns with the secular (Furani 2015). The secular is perceived as a resonance with finitude, residing within the human sensory experience, which implies it reflects or harmonizes with the fact that human life is finite and bound by time and space, so the secular is based on what humans can perceive, feel, and know through their senses and reason.

By analyzing Sheehan’s concept of enlightenment and Campbell’s enlightenment model of belief, we can gain a deeper insight into the connection between secularism and religion. This inquiry also shows the importance of using a historical-genealogical approach, which can reveal the changing and conflicting forces that influence the interaction between the secular and the religious.

The theoretical framework of the Enlightenment model is centered on epistemology, emphasizing the processes of acquiring knowledge, evidence, proof, and the justification of beliefs (Campbell et al. 2007). In this model, knowledge is conceived as propositions that can be formulated and subjected to testing. Within this framework, individuals are held entirely accountable for the evaluation and organization of their own beliefs, underscoring a sense of individual responsibility in the pursuit and interpretation of knowledge (Campbell et al. 2007).

One of the main challenges that an epistemology-based model faces is the question of universalism which is the idea that some concepts, such as the relationship with God, emotions, and the human condition, are applicable to all people regardless of their cultural, historical, or religious differences (Pandolfo 2018, 1–30). However, anthropology, as a discipline that studies the diversity of human societies and cultures, is often skeptical of such universal claims and argues that they are rooted in the particular worldview of the Western tradition. For instance, Mahmood argues that Taylor’s explanation of secularism relies on a particular Christian interpretation of religion, which holds that religion is an issue of conscience and personal conviction and that it is distinct from politics and culture (Mahmood 2010). She rejects this presumption by demonstrating how diverse religious traditions — like Islam — have unique views of religion that cannot be reduced to the Christian paradigm.

In examining the relationship between secularism and religion, Sheehan challenges the prevailing idea that the Enlightenment was exclusively a cradle of secular ideas. Rather than dismissing religion’s role in the eighteenth century, he highlights religious voices from that period, advocating for a shift in focus (Sheehan 2003). He suggests viewing the Enlightenment not merely as a set of philosophical precepts but as a constellation of formal and technical practices and institutions, driven by various media (Sheehan 2003). In line with Friedrich Kittler’s notion of “media,” Sheehan reframes secularization, considering it not as the inevitable decline of religion but as an account of how new “religions” emerged through Enlightenment media, integrating religion into the fabric of modernity.

The secular transcends categorization since it is entwined with life itself. The genealogical perspective encourages a deeper exploration of the historical and semantic complexity of the secular, acknowledging its dynamic nature and diverse manifestations within different traditions of thought and practice. Thus, religion and secularism are not fixed, static categories. For instance, Furani adds depth to this discussion by asserting the existence of a plurality of secular ontologies. He argues against confining the secular to a singular definition or object for transcendence, proposing the concept of “traditions of the secular” instead (Furani 2015). This nuanced approach encourages a better understanding of the diverse forms of life that emerge in relation to the secular. Asad argues that the notion of a universal definition of religion is a product of historical and discursive processes within the context of secular modernity (Asad 1993, 27–54). He criticizes the attempt to separate religion from other domains like politics, law, and science, asserting that such a separation is a modern Western norm and contends that understanding. Hence, it can also be argued that various forms of secularism arise in connection to specific religious formations, which can be identified as “secularisms” (Jakobsen and Pellegrini 2008).

Would it be orientalist bias to impose secularism as a uniform and fixed category? Anidjar suggests that secularism produces an orientalist conception of religion, which aligns with Said’s analysis. The secularized religion discussed by Said primarily pertained to Western Christendom, a multifaceted, dynamic, and dominant institution that covered diverse realms such as philosophy, science, economics, politics, and institutions (Anidjar 2006). Nonetheless, Anidjar suggests that drawing on Foucault’s insights, the contemporary concern should not merely revolve around being in favor of or against religion but rather focus on how religion and its discourse shape individuals’ connections with it and their perceptions of it. Hence, the notion of a universal understanding of religion and secularism, identifying them as mutually exclusive domains fails to acknowledge various traditions. In this context, I will examine, why studying Muslim traditions requires a histo-geneological approach in order to develop a more comprehensive understanding.

Ahmed criticizes the current construction of Islam, seeing it as the product of Western labels and influences that fall short of expressing the depth and variety of Islamic traditions and civilizations. He indicates that Islam should return to its original essence, which was rooted in the pre-colonial reality of various Muslim civilizations, instead of attempting to change itself to conform to Western ideals (Ahmed 2017, 176–245). In this context, it can be argued that state institutions that operate within the “religious” sphere are actually secular endeavors. According to Mahmood, the state actively intervenes and governs it through a variety of laws and policies (Mahmood 2010). She also challenges the idea of religious freedom, viewing it as a problematic concept that has frequently been used to legitimize the state’s intervention and control over religious communities and suggests that instead of limiting religious freedom to the secular-liberal framework, we should consider alternative approaches to understanding and enacting religious difference and coexistence (Mahmood 2010).

Dorroll’s analysis of the early republican institutions and academics’ views on Islam and its social function lays the foundation for “The Ankara Paradigm”, which is promoted and implemented by the Diyanet (Ministry of Religious Affairs) and the Ankara University Faculty of Divinity to manage the secular agenda (Dorroll 2014).

Firstly, The Ankara Paradigm encompasses some key features that shape its distinct perspective. The paradigm advocates for religious reform as a legitimizing force for incorporating religion into a secular and modern state, emphasizing its role in promoting social progress (Dorroll 2014). Also, it is deeply rooted in Turkish Islamic heritage, intentionally designed to align seamlessly with Turkish society and the envisioned future according to Kemalists (Dorroll 2014). This alignment is justified by linking the paradigm to its Hanafi roots, historically prominent among ancient Turkic peoples. Diyanet functions as an analog of the Christian church, exerting control over the “religious” domain (Dorroll 2014).

Nonetheless, secularism emerged as a response to the ecclesiastical order in Western societies, where Christianity necessitates a mediating institution, namely the church. Yet, in Islam, deen denotes a comprehensive way of life, not a distinct and exclusive private sphere and it is practiced without intermediary agencies, so deen is a broad concept that influences all aspects of society and individual life. Deen is not just a set of beliefs or rituals, but also a worldview and a system of governance that regulates human behavior and interactions (Ahmed 2017, 176–245). Hence, it becomes incongruous to assign the “Islamic” Diyanet the role of the Western church in regulating “religious” affairs.

Secondly, Islamic civilization, which is a secular idea in many ways, is impacted by secularization processes as Dalacoura argues. It is considered that the term “civilization” has an imperialist connotation; it is portrayed as a concept that liberated philosophy from theology and contributed to a secular conception of human perfectibility. Thus, the embrace of social engineering and the belief in shaping the social environment, even through religious precepts becomes an aspect of secularization in Islamic thought (Dalacoura 2019). What is more, Turkish secularism not only entails the embracement of the idea of civilization but also functions as a tool for statecraft to homogenize and ideologically control the population, rather than ensuring liberal democracy and tolerance (Ozyurek 2009). According to Ozyurek, Turkish secularism emphasizes state protection from religious influences and active regulation of citizens’ religious beliefs and practices. The Turkish state’s history involves continuous efforts to centralize authority and control over religious groups.

According to the concept of deen, religion and science are not separate domains, but rather integrated aspects of human knowledge and experience. To examine the link between religion and science, one needs to adopt the anachronistic approach that Harrison proposes. Creating a contemporary religion involves projecting our current conceptual frameworks onto historical landscapes, rather than exploring the past and it is a product of historical amnesia that seeks to erase the traces of the past (Harrison 2015, 1–20). The manifestations of science and religion in their contemporary forms are not inherent or immutable categories; instead, they have evolved within the context of the Western cognitive framework. Over time, the existence and meanings attributed to both science and religion have undergone significant transformations.

Harrison claims that in antiquity, science and religion were viewed as fundamental to personal traits and habits, which is a significant departure from modern conceptions. Religion was seen as an internal virtue that consisted of a developed mindset and an internalized act of worship. On the other hand, science was seen as a routine facet of life, representing intellectual qualities like comprehension, scientific awareness, and wisdom. In alignment with Aristotle’s aphorism “By nature all men want to know,” religion was viewed as a virtue that provided instruction on how to serve God and was concerned with whether such devotion was proper. On the other hand, science was a virtue that focused on producing new information rather than just repeating what had already been discovered. It required the methodical acquisition of knowledge through logical means. The historical turn represents a divergence from the previous focus on the inherent values of both fields. With the development of belief systems, identity constructions, and sources of conflict, religion became a broader term. At the same time, science took on a more limited function, mostly related to the natural and physical sciences, and was perceived as a methodical strategy, a system of authority, or a means of advancing knowledge (Harrison 2015, 1–20).

For instance, it is possible to examine the relationship between science and relation in the context of the discipline of psychology. The tension between universalism and relativism also affects the field of psychoanalysis, which emerged from the Western context and attempted to provide a scientific account of the human psyche. Pandolfo has tried to engage in a dialogue between psychoanalysis and Islam to explore the similarities and differences between the two traditions. Pandolfo does not aim to translate Islamic concepts into psychoanalytic terms, or vice versa, but rather to show how both traditions attempt to understand the self, the psyche, and the nefs in relation to the divine. Her ethnographic work proposes that the medical-spiritual tradition of the nafs in Islam provides a framework for understanding and addressing mental illness (Pandolfo 2018, 1–30).

One of the examples of re-articulation of the modern scientific idea of the psyche is provided by Soyubol. The Kemalist aim of modern secular nation-building was to build ‘healthy’ secular Turkish citizens and society (Soyubol 2022). Soyubol points to the figure of Mazhar Osman whose psychiatric project focused on conceptualizing mental disorders as biological and physiological illnesses, aligning with the state’s emphasis on modernization and the scientific approach to healthcare. There is a constant ambiguity between scientific and religious discourses, despite Osman’s promotion of the idea that madness is a physical illness, and should be treated by doctors and medication, not through religious practices, so he aims to replace traditional terms like “jinn” and “hodja” with modern concepts like “psychiatry” and “clinic” (Soyubol 2022). The terminology employed to characterize mental illness defines and legitimizes it when one tries to investigate secular presumptions. In order to demonstrate that, Soyubol addresses the term “ruh” which is used both in religious and medical discourses, creating an overlap between material and immaterial perspectives. For instance, psychiatric hospitals in Turkey are officially called hospitals of sicknesses of the mind, soul, and nerves, combining old spiritual and new physiological connotations (Soyubol 2022).

Exploring how our view of Enlightenment determines our relation with the concepts of secularism, religion, and science; it is also crucial to point out the narrative of disenchantment. The loss of meaning and value in a world dominated by rationalization entails disenchantment due to Weber, leaving the door open to disenchantment that can also generate new forms of enchantment. According to Josephson-Storm, disenchantment is a myth, so it has retained its element of mystery and magic since there isn’t a distinct historical break, and Europe hasn’t completely given up on its belief in spirits, and the critique of disenchantment is a form of dominance and power over worldviews that are assumed as irrational and “religious”(Josephson 2017).

In a post-modern world in which human beings can be enchanted, their belief in the supernatural, namely god or gods is always influenced by their personal or collective experiences, which may either support or challenge their faith (Luhrmann 2020). For example, some people may experience miracles or blessings that strengthen their faith, while others may experience tragedies or injustices that weaken their faith. There are heuristic (intuition) and analytic (deliberate reasoning) reasoning forms, which can sometimes conflict with or complement each other, depending on the situation or the problem (Luhrmann 2020). In other words, there are two main ways of thinking or processing information: one that is fast, automatic, and based on intuition or gut feeling, and another that is slow, conscious, and based on logic or evidence. Hence, there are different types of beliefs that we hold about the world: some that are ordinary, every day, and based on observation or common sense, and some that are extraordinary, sacred, and based on faith or revelation. These two types of beliefs can have different cognitive attitudes, so different ways of understanding and expressing them.

In conclusion, the conventional characterization of Enlightenment as a definitive transition towards rationality, resulting in a disenchanted world, proves inadequate in capturing the diverse modes of reasoning that underlie the various belief structures. This study has undertaken a critical examination of the underlying assumptions implicit in the universally applied conceptualization of secularism, highlighting a notable oversight in comprehending non-Western belief systems and their relationship with the concept of science. To enhance our grasp of these concepts, I advocate for the adoption of a historical-genealogical framework. This approach facilitates a nuanced recognition of the manifold manifestations of secularism and its impact on Islamic traditions and civilizations.

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Elif Feyza Dinç

I am a sociology and political science & international relations student at Boğaziçi University. I publish the papers I write during my undergraduate period.